Hello

April 2025 President’s Letter

Greetings from the President

By Sheral C. Kellar, President
National Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Judge – Chief
Louisiana Workforce Commission

 

 

“Throw me something mister”

 

On Tuesday, March 4, 2025, many states celebrated Mardi Gras, especially Louisiana.  Some say Mardi Gras originated in Mobile, Alabama, but I have my doubts about that. I’m a Louisiana girl. No one does Mardi Gras better or quite like the Big Easy; regardless of its origin. Mardi Gras, French for “Fat Tuesday,” is preceded by Ash Wednesday which marks the beginning of Lent. Lent, a 40 day season of renewal and reflection, begins on Ash Wednesday and ends at sundown on Holy Thursday, April 17, 2025. Lent is based on three Christian principles.  All of us can benefit from these three principles, prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, regardless of your religious beliefs.

Most define prayer as communicating with a higher power. While that is correct, prayer can also be an earnest hope or desire. “My prayer for you is that you have continued good health.”  Prayer can be an expression of gratitude or thankfulness. “Thank you for all that I am and ever hope to be.” Essentially, prayer is an expression of desire for yourself or for others.  During Lenten season, focus on a desire to be the best workers’ compensation judge you can be. Prayers of thanksgiving also seek guidance and a thankful heart. Be mindful every day of the things that you have, the things you have achieved, and the platform you now occupy.  From this platform, you have the unenviable role of being able to dispense justice to thousands less fortunate than yourself. Let all of us do so with the grace, dignity, and temperament deserving of our role as workers’ compensation adjudicators.

Most of you are aware that in observance of Lent, people of varying faiths traditionally abstain from meat on Fridays. We practice self-control through fasting. People fast in different ways during the Lenten season. I gave up chocolate. You see, I’m a chocoholic! This is not an easy thing for me. However, while fasting from chocolate, I am mindful that eating loads of sugar is not healthy. Abstaining from chocolate also gives me an opportunity to focus on my health, to make better food choices, and to lose weight; a little lagniappe (a word likely of Spanish origin “something given as a bonus or extra gift”). In addition to the health benefits of fasting, it can promote introspection, humility, and create a space for focused reflection. Food is not the only thing from which we can fast. Television, social media, using offensive language, swearing, on-line purchases, smoking, and drinking alcohol are all activities from which to fast. During this Lenten season, adjudicators can reflect on the enormous power they have to implement change. I am not suggesting that you become activists.  What I am suggesting is that you seek guidance to be the best adjudicator ever. If your bench presence is not what you would want it to be, focus on how you can make it better. If your decisions are not well-reasoned and self-briefing, take time to focus on your judicial writing skills. If your judicial temperament is a topic of water cooler discussion, take the time to practice mindfulness.

Almsgiving is the third principle of the Lenten Season.  Almsgiving is a way to extend compassion and mercy to those in need. Throughout the year, many of us give to our state chapter of the Kids’ Chance Scholarship Program. The NAWCJ gives to the National Kids’ Chance Foundation. Kids’ Chance provides scholarships to children of workers who have been killed or significantly disabled in an accident compensable under a state or federal Workers’ Compensation law. Usually, Kids’ Chance has more money than it has recipients. Nevertheless, keep giving – not just during Lenten season but all year round. Kudos to us who think of those less fortunate than ourselves. When you are on the bench dispensing judgment, find out if the recipient of a death benefit or an award of permanent and total disability has a school-age child whose dream of going to a post-secondary institution has been affected by the loss of a parent or the parent’s income.  Remember to give that name to your state affiliate of Kids’ Chance.

Many know Mardi Gras as a celebration of parades, frivolity, and controlled pandemonium. It is that and much more. It is the end of a season of unrestrained inhibitions and to reiterate, the beginning of a season of renewal and reflection. Its colors green, purple, and gold symbolize justice, faith, and power, respectively. These colors reflect the epitome of our role as workers’ compensation judges. We should never take for granted the power to dispense justice or the faith that what we are doing is right. During this Lenten season we can all reflect on that.

Laissez les bon temps rouler

(“let the good times roll”)

 

 

Can Benefits Be Denied in Your State for Misconduct?

By Amanda Luedtke,

Administrative Law Judge

Wisconsin Division of Hearings

Milwaukee, WI

 

Does your State have a “no-fault” standard, whereby employees are allowed to collect workers’ compensation benefits regardless of their actions while employed? If not, do you regularly see defendants/respondents’ asserting misconduct defenses? Please take the survey at the bottom of this article (results will be posted in the next Lex & Verum).

If you are sitting there reading this and wondering what states have no-fault standards, if any, look no further than Wisconsin prior to 2015 Wisconsin Act 180, which created Wis. Stat. s. 102.43(9)(e).

Wis. Stat. 102.43(9)(e) was enacted on February 29, 2016, and it specifically states that temporary disability benefits shall not be payable to an employee if “the employee’s employment with the employer has been suspended or terminated due to misconduct, as defined in s. 108.04 (5), or substantial fault, as defined in s. 108.04 (5g) (a), by the employee connected with the employee’s work[1].”

Prior to the statute’s enactment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Brakebush Bros., Inc. v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 623, 563 N.W.2d 512 (1997), made it clear that benefits were not to be denied to injured employees, regardless of whether they were considered “good” or “bad” employees. Specifically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:

The purpose of worker’s compensation disability benefits is to compensate employees who have lost the ability to work, temporarily or permanently, due to a work-related injury, regardless of whether they are good or bad employees. It contravenes public policy to allow an employer to avoid paying disability benefits to a disabled employee without evidence that the employee’s activities are inconsistent with his or her injury. Without such a requirement, the law would leave employees suffering from legitimate work-related injuries in grave danger of being left both unemployed and unable to work due to their work-related disability, without compensation and potentially with a lower earning capacity.” Id. 636-37.

However, Wisconsin was not a complete no-fault state prior to 2016, as there were still penalties put in place if an employee violated a safety provision of the employer or were injured while intoxicated. The outcomes of these types of cases were heavily fact-dependent and provided for intriguing results.

An example of such an “intriguing” case is Friend. v. John Fink Trucking, Inc and Liberty Mut’l Fire Ins. Co. WC No. 96031784 (LIRC Nov 6, 1997.) In this case, the employee was delivering and unloading grain for a customer when he was injured. The customer stated the employee smelled like alcohol and a blood-alcohol test showed the employee BAC was at .1222 after the incident. Additionally, during testimony, the applicant stated he had between 12 and 24 beers the night before but stopped drinking that night by 10:30 p.m. The Commission held the injury was work-related but due to the employee being intoxicated there would be a reduction of 15 percent to the employee’s temporary disability benefits. I do believe if this case were decided today, the outcome would be different given the enacted statutes above.

However, right now in Wisconsin, there is not a lot of guidance from case law in regard to worker compensation benefits and misconduct. As such, our ALJs have found it beneficial to reiterate through CLEs and presentations what is needed for such defenses and what benefits can be suspended/denied due to misconduct. In order to meet our specific misconduct statute, an Employer may need to submit various pieces of evidence, such as a drug and alcohol policy, an attendance policy, and previously documented warnings for employee violations. I would love to know via the survey link below, how your state deals with misconduct and worker compensation benefits. I will post the results in the next Lex & Verum.

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/2YLC3N5

 

[1] Wis. Stats 108.04(5) and 108.04(5g)(a) are the Wisconsin Unemployment Statutes that are well establish regarding misconduct and substantial fault.

 

 

 

AI, Innovation, and ADR: The Future Is Now

Reprinted with permission from the January 29, 2025 edition of the ALM Daily Report. © 2024 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

 

Douglas J. Witten[1]

In 2011, IBM’s Watson computer system – then an early, noteworthy triumph of artificial intelligence (AI) – was making headlines. Watson had defeated a couple of former Jeopardy!  champions, dazzling with its encyclopedic knowledge and recall. Watson tantalized us with visions of applying AI technology to solve problems in groundbreaking ways, in the healthcare context and beyond.

Only that didn’t happened as planned. By 2022, Watson Health had fizzled and IBM sold it off to a private equity firm.[2]

Despite failing to reach the success for which IBM had hoped, Watson gave alternative dispute resolution (ADR) professionals an early AI “aha!” moment. With such capacity and promise, was AI next coming for our jobs as attorneys, mediators and arbitrators?[3]

Flash-forward to 2025, when AI has jolted the ADR field with its disruptive potential. The buzz around AI is deafening, and with good reason: Any competent ADR practitioner must understand the risks and rewards these new technologies bring to our field.

With 2011 but a distant memory, AI is poised to impact ADR substantially. Nonetheless, even as AI continues its inevitable advance into mediation and arbitration realms, key caveats remain.

Laying the Groundwork for Innovation

By 2020, the concept of online dispute resolution (ODR) had been around for years. However, ADR’s adoption and embrace of technology-aided mediation and arbitration, particularly via online video platforms, was not widespread before the implementation of COVID-19 lockdowns and travel restrictions.

Today, negotiating and resolving conflict remotely seems natural. Increasingly tech-savvy, we effortlessly interface with website chatbots, casually problem-solve with Alexa and Siri, and now consult with AI on any challenge we can dream up.

Adapting to ODR options has underscored the benefits technology brings to our ADR practices. Meanwhile, we more fully appreciate the tradeoffs inherent in balancing convenience, efficiency, and sound processes.

AI’s Meteoric Development

As ChatGPT and other large language models (LLMs), such as Gemini, Claude, and even legal-specific platforms have emerged, AI’s potential to shape ADR processes is eminently clearer. AI models’ capacity to cull and synthesize enormous sets of data has improved exponentially, engendering powerful new applications.

AI can support ADR providers in expediting logistical and administrative tasks, like scheduling and client communication, billing, marketing, and the circulation of standard forms. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) offers an AI chatbot to facilitate parties’ arbitration clause-drafting[4] – instead of repurposing boilerplate language, attorneys can use accessible AI tools to tailor clauses – and JAMS offers AI-assisted reporting services.[5] Examples like this will continue to proliferate.

AI can also enhance ADR proceedings themselves. Consider the mediator engaged with intransigent parties struggling to resolve a lawsuit. In preparation for the mediation – or even later into the process, out of ideas and facing the possibility of ongoing conflict or deadlock – the mediator might consult an AI platform to dissect risks and brainstorm negotiation strategies and potential solutions. Using AI to inject new perspectives based on decision science and analysis of likely judicial outcomes, for example, could mean the difference between resolution and protracted litigation.

Given the voluminous documents that might be involved in arbitration, and the need to analyze potentially complex facts and law, AI can also serve neutral decision-makers. Reviewing, organizing, and summarizing large volumes of documents, and creating initial agreement and award drafts, are other tasks for which AI is well suited.[6]

Balancing Risk and Reward

Incorporating AI tools, advocates and neutrals are wise to proceed cautiously, ever committed to upholding duties of professional responsibility, ethics, confidentiality, privacy, and security. Mediators and arbitrators must endeavor to limit bias and seek fairness in our ADR processes. Delegation to AI does not absolve practitioners of honoring these principles.

Practitioners must also understand how AI systems safeguard information and limit its accessibility to unauthorized viewers. Everyone has heard tales of so-called “hallucinations,” too, whereby an AI model generates misleading or incorrect results. Plainly, professionals incorporating AI into their ADR practices should be wary of trusting these tools without exercising due diligence and vetting them thoroughly.

Codes of professional responsibility, conduct, and ethics are increasingly emerging to address the AI explosion. Institutions including the American Bar Association,[7] AAA,[8] JAMS[9] and the Silicon Valley Arbitration & Mediation Center,[10] among others, have issued thoughtful rules and guidance to assist us in the AI-powered era.

AI Limits?

Mediation is typically less document-intensive than arbitration. As mediators lack decision-making power, they aren’t tasked with sorting and digesting high volumes of documents to make rulings or determinations.

And mediation is often about more than applying law to facts and reaching a “right” answer. Mediators routinely invoke nuanced skills like empathy, listening, and rapport-building to make parties comfortable engaging in the negotiation process. The raw logic of an AI system, without accompanying abilities to read parties’ emotions, body language, and vocal tone, does not supplant the human attributes mediators ply to resolve conflict.[11]

Arbitration requires neutrals to collect and sift through facts, draw legal conclusions, and decide cases. AI currently seems well-adapted to make certain decisions and logical deductions based on input data. However, for perhaps some of the same reasons we aren’t all yet in driver-less vehicles – even though the technology is here[12] – parties embroiled in high-stakes arbitrations for now remain unlikely to hand full decision-making authority to non-human, AI solutions.

Conclusion and a Look Ahead

Long before robot neutrals become commonplace, AI will serve as a collaborative partner that aids mediators and arbitrators in more efficiently performing complementary tasks. Employed conscientiously, AI can perform certain functions more efficiently than humans and, ideally, free neutrals to focus on exercising our uniquely human resolution skills.

Perhaps you are not quite ready to visit an AI-enabled “Dr. Watson” avatar instead of your family physician. But AI will continue to revolutionize best practices in the pharmaceutical and medical fields. Similarly, mediators and arbitrators who expand their capacities to resolve disputes by collaborating with AI tools will be the next ADR innovators.

As AI technology evolves, ADR practitioners owe it to our clients to remain educated and informed. The essence of ADR mechanisms will keep humans in the loop for the immediate future.

Yet AI presents immediate opportunities for economizing mediation and arbitration processes. A confluence of societal and attitudinal shifts, along with powerful technological advances, combine to stir a sea change. Appreciating AI’s potential to improve ADR practices, while also understanding its potential risks, is paramount to our ultimate goal: more satisfactory dispute resolution experiences.

[1] Douglas J. Witten (innovativeadr.com) is a mediator, arbitrator, and author who has 28+ years of legal experience.  He has mediated 1500+ cases since becoming a registered neutral in 2003 and offers dispute resolution services across areas including healthcare, commercial matters, injuries and accidents. Mr. Witten is Secretary of the State Bar of Georgia ADR Section and past Chair of the Atlanta Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section. He is author of The Stoic Negotiator™ newsletter and Time-Tested: The Stoic Negotiator’s Five Keys for the Modern Deal.
[2] See, e.g., Lizzie O’Leary, How IBM’s Watson Went From the Future of Health Care to Sold Off for Parts, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2022), https://slate.com/technology/2022/01/ibm-watson-health-failure-artificial-intelligence.html.
[3] Douglas J. Witten, Cyber-Mediators in ADR Future, DAILY REPORT (May 24, 2011), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202551176665/. See also The Dark Side of Watson, NPR (Feb. 20,2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/02/20/133916058/the-dark-side-of-watson.
[4]4ClauseBuilder AI, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://clausebuilder.ai/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2025).
[5]JAMS PREVAIL TRANSCRIPTION, https://www.jamsadr.com/prevail-transcription (last visited Jan. 21, 2025).
[6]To wit, AAA has recently announced an AI-powered writing and document analysis tool. Bob Ambrogi, American Arbitration Association Partners with Clearbrief to Offer AI-Powered Legal Writing Tools to Its Panelists and Parties, LAWNEXT (Jan. 14, 2025), https://www.lawnext.com/2025/01/exclusive-american-arbitration-associationpartners-with-clearbrief-to-offer-ai-powered-legal-writing-tools-to-its-panelists-and-parties.html.
[7]Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESP., Formal Op. 512 (Jul. 29, 2024), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/ethics-opinions/abaformal-opinion-512.pdf.
[8]Principles Supporting the Use of AI in Alternative Dispute Resolution, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION(Nov.2023),https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/principles%20Supporting%20the%20Use%20of%20AI%20in%20Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution.pdf.
[9]JAMS Artificial Intelligence Disputes Clause, Rules and Protective Order (effective June 14, 2024), available at https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/jams-ai-rules.pdf.
[10]Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration, SILICON VALLEY ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CENTER (Apr. 30, 2024), https://svamc.org/wp-content/uploads/SVAMC-AI-Guidelines-First-Edition.pdf.
[11]How might AI advance here? Some suggest that AI becomes more effective by highlighting the humans in AI instead of humanizing AI. See Oguz A. Acar, et al., Research: Consumers Don’t Want AI to Seem Human, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan. 7, 2025), https://hbr.org/2025/01/research-consumers-dont-want-ai-to-seemhuman.
[12]Lingering “glitches” are well-publicized but will surely become less frequent. See Laurie Perez, Dean Fioresi, LA Man Nearly Misses Flight as Self-Driving Waymo Taxi Drives Around Parking Lot in Circles, CBS NEWS (updated Jan. 5, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/la-man-nearly-misses-flight-as-self-driving-waymo-taxidrives-around-parking-lot-in-circles/.

There is no Surgery Penalty

By David Langham[1]
Deputy Chief Judge
Florida Judges of Compensation Claims
Pensacola, FL

 

What is the point of surgery, therapy, or immobilization? Often, such treatment will be delivered for relief of symptoms. Or, just as likely, the care will be for remediation, or “removal/correction of a defect or disease.” The distinction is important in workers’ compensation. Various jurisdictions often divide medical care into two main categories: “remedial” and “palliative.” This is seemingly simple, though there is great potential for any particular treatment to evade clear categorization. Still, working definitions are worthwhile:

palliative care: treatment that relieves the symptoms of a serious illness, but does not cure the disease itself.[2]
remedialconcerned with the correction, removal, or abatement of an evil, defect, or disease.[3]

Among the remedial potentials is surgery. When surgery is performed, the outcome might be characterized as successful, or not. However, these are not binary choices, the degree of success in either removing or correcting physical dysfunction may vary depending on the patient, premorbidity, comorbidity, and more. Beyond these distinctions, “success” may lie in the eye of the beholder and may include both subjective and objective indicia. That said, the intent of surgery is clear — correction of a physical manifestation or cause with the intent to render improvement.

There has been mention of a “surgery penalty” that warrants consideration and discussion. The question is typically phrased “why is there a surgery penalty in workers’ compensation?” This references that a malady or diagnosis (herniated disc) may equate to a higher impairment rating if “unoperated” or “not surgically treated,” but the same condition results in a lower rating if surgery is performed.

The clear answer to the inquiry is that there is no such penalty. The assignment of impairment ratings is not about benefit or detriment, but merely measurement. The role of the expert physician is not a determination of what is right, fair, or equitable in gross or financial terms. The physician determines the impairment based on the coincidence of science, consensus, and equity in the sense of rational relationship between the physical outcome of any particular malady or injury compared to the constellation of other maladies.

To say that there is a “surgery penalty” overstates a negative perception. Any perception of a penalty ignores the purpose of surgery, the logic of impairment, and the sanctity of professional roles. Surgery is supposed to repair and remediate. A patient is supposed to experience increased function and decreased symptoms. There are admittedly unsuccessful surgeries. There are potentials for adjusting ratings in those instances. Nonetheless, in various cases, a patient undergoing surgical repair may be assessed with a lower rating and be paid less resulting compensation because of determinations of some regulatory or statutory construct (there is less compensation in some systems when there is a lower rating). Correspondingly, however, the surgery most often also means a better recovery or remediation, better function. There is no penalty, merely a recognition of benefit versus loss.

This is illustrated in a scenario in which a mistake occurred. The patient, with an admittedly compensable left knee injury, is scheduled for surgery to repair specific trauma, and the surgeon is authorized to also repair some preexisting degenerative changes during the surgery. Those premorbidities were not per se the employer/carrier’s responsibility, but the repairs are intended to facilitate the worker returning to function and work. The patient awakens from an uneventful and successful surgery, with degenerative changes repaired. But the successful surgery was inadvertently performed on the right knee. The surgeon discovered the error after inserting the scope in the right knee, and repairing degenerative changes as planned. But when the surgeon looked for the specific work injury, it was not found (it was in the other knee).  The surgeon apologized and did not charge for the right knee surgery. The patient was pleased with the result and returned months later for the same surgeon to perform the originally planned left knee surgery, which occurred without complication. Recovery was uneventful, and by the time the case came to trial, the worker had returned to work.

The trial was about the injured worker seeking to have the employer/carrier remain responsible then for the right knee, fortuitously repaired. The legal logic was that any surgical intervention might leave a patient susceptible to future problems, complications, and require further care. The lawyer’s theory was simple – “the E/C’s agent (doctor) cut the right knee open and the E/C should be responsible for it from now on.” The case was tried basically on the information above. The medical records from the doctor and the surgery facility were placed in evidence. There were no expert opinions and no medical testimony. The injured worker did not prevail.

The injured worker in that case sought relief not through calculus, trigonometry, algebra, or scientific medical opinion. The theory was simple math: “surgery equals injury.” The lawyer brought various appellate decisions cited in support of the concept that an E/C could be held responsible for the future results of surgery. That is, if there were untoward results proven related to the right (wrong) knee surgery. The legal failure was that the attorney sought to have such results, poor ones, assumed, presumed, conjectured, and compensated.

The attorney wanted a judicial decision that surgery equals harm, damage, and injury. That said, there are many surgeries performed every day. One article in the International Journal of Surgery estimates that “Globally, a staggering 310 million major surgeries are performed each year; around 40 to 50 million in USA.”[4] If the low end of that is accurate, that is about 110,000 each day. That is just the “major” surgeries. Can we presume that all these are damaging people? That assumption would be unsupportable and preposterous.

Surgery is usually remedial. It is intended to be, and often is, successful. It treats symptoms, ameliorates structural flaws or damage, and facilitates the return of function. It is beneficial and reparative. That said, surgery is not miraculous or foolproof. Results can be less than hoped in a given case. There are patients whose outcome from surgery is a worsening of complaints, symptoms, and function. There are likely patients whose post-surgical condition is grievous or worse.

The point for the physician assigning a rating is not that poor outcomes cannot occur. They can and sometimes do. The point is that outstanding outcomes can and do also occur. The lawyer in the story above was not “wrong” in the claim for compensability under the law. Poor results, if the surgery in fact caused them, may be compensable. The flaw in logic there was in the failure to bring evidence. The missing element was any evidence from a medical professional that in that specific instance, the mistaken right knee surgery was damaging or detrimental.

This came to mind recently, when a question was raised in a public meeting regarding the idea of permanent impairment and effect of surgery. The question was, essentially, “why do the impairment guides punish a patient for having surgery.” That is a challenging question to answer because it is foundationally flawed.

The questioner’s point rests on the foundation of the misuse and misdirection that legislators and regulators have foisted upon rating guides. Essentially, laws have used impairment (loss of function in some body process) as a proxy for disability. In striving to compensate disability, and frustrated in their search for a reasonably simple, replicable, and transparent method of measure, jurisdictions have set forth formulae through which broad and arguably discriminatory, arbitrary, entitlement to benefits are determined by impairment assignments. That governments use this method does not mean impairment equates to disability. It means that the laws and lawmakers have decided to forgo the daunting task of disability determination and focused instead on the serendipitous availability of a proxy or substitute (impairment), which brings with it transparency, replicability, acceptance (consensus), and science.

Examples abound in which the higher the impairment number, the more benefits paid to the injured worker. There are many distinctions from state to state both in valuing such impairment and in striving for legislative equity or parity. There are examples of arbitrary results. but those are legal, legislative, or regulatory results which are the law of a jurisdiction, subject to its statutory and regulatory process. That such a process produces a particular figure is not the concern of the medical professional assigning a rating.

A physician might conclude that some injury(ies) should be compensated at some dollar value. With a knowledge of the jurisdiction’s law, the facts about the patient’s pre-injury earnings, and a bit of math, the physician might back out the necessary impairment to equate to the arbitrary total value first assumed or presumed. That algebra is certainly possible.

However, that exceeds the physician scope. That removes the physician from scientific arbiter of injury, remediation, and function, which is the impairment opinion. Instead, such a reverse-engineering substitutes an arbitrary and conclusory monetary value judgement. It does not result in a scientific outcome that is the appropriate role of the physician. It affords the physician a subjective perception and expression of fairness or equity that would be different with each examiner. It undermines predictability, transparency, and consistency. It undermines the science and consensus elements of medicine.

Admittedly, when the physician sticks to the science, process, and guides, there may nonetheless be arbitrary outcomes. Impairment guides are that, guides. They are scientific, but at time militate to consensus rather than science. They are crafted and edited by humans, and will thus be imperfect products from imperfect beings. Still, those result not from subjective intercession, but from the operation of the law. If that law is unbalanced or inhospitable, it is for the legislature or regulator to change.

The critic in that meeting was troubled that when a patient undergoes surgery, there is a probability that the impairment rating will be less. That is, surgery will equal remediation (to some degree) and thus increased function. The treatment will result in the intended effect. The care will promote recovery. The residual disfunction, the impairment, will be less. The logic of this outcome is readily apparent.

The critic mislabeled the result as a “penalty.” No patient is penalized by successful medical care. This is true regardless of modality, be it the most basic or most complex. The patient who receives relief, return of function, and recovery is not “penalized.” In fact, that patient is greatly benefitted, though he or she may receive less monetary compensation.

The major purpose of medical care is remediation of function and amelioration of symptoms. The major purpose of workers’ compensation is restoration of function and return to activity and work. There is no “penalty” in being restored and repaired. The degree of impairment is equated to some compensation for loss. That statutory conversion is at least partially arbitrary and statutory. The workers’ compensation systems are not providing “damages” for injury, pain, suffering, and other loss. These laws provide for compensation for loss. They are specific in this regard. When loss is decreased through repair/remediation, it is logical that compensation may likewise decrease. Whether that is logical or not is a decision for the legislators or regulators. For the physician, the logic is simply when there is remediation and restoration of function, the loss is less and the impairment is less.

Thus, if a patient has a surgery and therefore suffers less loss, then there is less workers’ compensation. And it must be remembered, there is also more rapid return to work and other function.

In this regard, it has been noted often that professional athletes have had seemingly miraculous recoveries. They often benefit from their excellent fitness and hard pre-injury training. They also may have different motivations and abilities in the wake of injury. Even so, their recoveries are often dependent on surgical intervention. Is the player benefitted by a denial of surgery, to preserve dysfunction and prolong recuperation or convalescence? No, the player benefits, as do all injured workers, from prompt, careful, compassionate, and thorough care. That may decrease convalescence, but no one should argue that the player is penalized by returning to function and the field. Returning to function and productivity is the reason for care and treatment.

The evaluator should remain in the lane defined in the applicable guides. The physical injury, diagnosis, and recovery should be considered. The monetary outcome directed by the appropriate rating is not the scientist’s concern or consideration. That outcome, equity, fairness, and compensation is for the law and regulators. The doctor sticks to the science and consensus of the guides and determines impairment. In doing so, a consideration may be whether remediation, the surgery, occurred. The intent and the effect both bear consideration, but the consensus stands that surgery generally improves function and remediates loss. Less permanent impact means less impairment. That is not a “surgery penalty,” it is a logical and simple reality.

[1] David Langham is the Florida Deputy Chief Judge of Compensation Claims. He has published four books, dozens of articles, hundreds of blog posts and delivered hundreds of lectures on the law, process, and judicial ethics. Although he serves as an advisor to the AMA Guides to Permanent Impairment Editorial Panel, and is involved with various workers’ compensation professional organizations, intuitions, and professions, the views expressed here are his own and do not represent any employer, organization, or affiliation.
[2] Palliative, Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100302553.
[3] Remedial, Meriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remedial#medicalDictionary.
[4] Geoffrey P. Dobson, Trauma of Major Surgery: A Global Problem that is not Going Away, International Journal of Surgery, 2020 Sep; 81: 47–54.

The Impact of Human Effort and Employment in an Increasingly Automated Workplace

By Jennifer Nicaud, Administrative Law Judge

Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission

Jackson, MS

 

In the early 1960s, a committee of scientists and social activists sent an open letter to the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson: “The cybernation revolution” will create “a separate nation of the poor, the unskilled, the jobless” who will be unable to find work and to afford life’s necessities, they argued.

Actress Fran Drescher, the President of the Screen Actors Guild- American Federation of Television and Radio Artists told the crowd at a press conference that “we are all going to be in jeopardy of being replaced by machines,” it was not part of a science fiction script. The path of technological progress has produced controversy between innovation and the labor market, from the scribes put out of work by the printing press to the weavers forced to compete with mechanized looms and the factory workers displaced by robots. A.I., too, will surely shake up the labor force in meaningful ways in the coming decades.

An International Monetary Fund ( “IMF”) report found that 40% of the jobs around the world will be affected by AI. In advanced economies , the IMF prediction rises to 60% of jobs set to be affected by machine learning, with about half being negatively impacted. The losers will face lower salaries, reduced hiring, and some jobs will disappear altogether. The challenge is to find policies and program now to minimize the negative outcomes of AI such as unemployment and job-market dislocation and capture A.I.’s potential to boost productivity.

As Companies seek to achieve high warehouse operations, efficiency becomes paramount to meet broader objectives. In an age of next-day delivery, expectations on the warehouse staff has increased dramatically. This need for speed in delivery has fundamentally altered the landscape of warehouse operations. One would think to meet heightened demands, a warehouse employer would increase the staffing levels. However, it appears that this solution is unviable with rising labor costs and in some cases a scarcity of available labor. Thus, it appears that many warehouses have shifted the way that they operate to meet these demands without relying solely on human labor.

Automation has emerged as the alleged ally to support the warehouse workers. The benefits of automation to the employer are clear. Automation can significantly augment the human capacities. Automated guided vehicles (AGVs) and robots can transport goods within the warehouse, which will reduce the physical strain on warehouse workers and increase the speed of filling orders. Moreover, advanced conveyor systems and robotic arms can expedite packing and palletizing processes. However, these automatized workers may take positions filled by employees, many of whom are uneducated and may have difficulties finding positions in the future.

However, while automation is increasingly being employed for tasks that were traditionally performed manually, there is little question that the change can lead to fewer injuries.  The technology may bring new risks. The implementation of automation can reduce instances of repetitive strain injuries and other common injuries, but it can also lead to more severe workers compensation claims as workers interact with machines in different ways. Automated operations can give employees a false sense of safety because they are performing fewer manual tasks and may perceive that there is no longer a danger of being exposed to traditional workplace hazards. However, many companies utilizing these compressed time lines have become the subject of several investigations including by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration on worker injury rates and work site delivery “quotas.”

In an era of automated workplaces, the uneducated workforce is likely to face significant challenges finding employment, as automation tends to replace jobs that require repetitive, routine tasks, which are often held by individuals with lower levels of education. Automation could lead to increased unemployment, a need for significant retraining programs, or a shift towards jobs that heavily rely on interpersonal skills where automation is less prevalent, like care-giving or certain service industries.

Jobs that are easily automated, like data entry, assembly line work, or basic customer service are often held by less educated workers, making them highly susceptible to job losses due to automation. To remain competitive in the job market, uneducated workers will need to acquire new skills through training programs to qualify for jobs that require more complex cognitive abilities or interpersonal interactions.

The potential exists for job shifts to service sectors due to automation. fragment???? Employment in fields like healthcare support, food service, or personal care may become more accessible to less educated workers as these sectors may be less easily automated. Automation of the workplace has the potential for significant income inequality. Thus, if my job consists of carrying things in a warehouse and a robot could take over those tasks, then it really depends on what other tasks I’m doing in my job. If I’m doing skilled tasks, such as programming the robot or overseeing its supply routes, then this innovation can translate into higher wages. But if that’s not what I’m doing, then there’s no reason for an employer to pay me. If less educated workers struggle to find new jobs or are forced to accept lower-paying positions, it could exacerbate income inequality.

If you were a farm worker 120 years ago, would it have been possible for you to imagine a world where only one in 20 people worked on farms? Even 20 years ago, economists probably wouldn’t have predicted that there would be 800,000 personal trainers employed in the US today and 2.5 million jobs in the app development industry.

During  the  industrial  revolution,  local  and  national  governments  made  major public investments to teach the skills of reading, writing, and math that were necessary for the new jobs at that time. There was also investment in new roads, ports, and other infrastructure. In this new era, many have suggested there is a need public investment in digital skills for everyone, as well as digital highways that allow regions to participate in new economic opportunities.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a general-purpose technology, or GPT, and has applications across industries and the potential to transform the broad economy. According to a 2022 IBM report, one-quarter of US companies have already adopted some form of A.I., while Chinese and Indian companies are at nearly 60 percent. A.I. has made inroads in tech, manufacturing, healthcare, banking and financial services, media, retail, hospitality, and auto making.

The differences between A.I. and other industrial transformation has been the speed in which A.I. has been adopted. It took almost 100 years from when the first steam engine enabled the mechanization of textile production and railroad transportation in the United States at the beginning of the 19th century until peak adoption by the turn of the next century. By contrast, in February 2023 a research note from Swiss investment bank UBS found that within two months of its initial release, ChatGPT had 100 million monthly active users around the globe. The researchers found, by comparison, TikTok took nine months to reach 100 million monthly users, and Instagram about 2.5 years.

Some believe that A.I.’s productivity curve may also be faster. In light of the pace of automation in the work place, significant education in workforce development and retraining programs must be created and incentives for companies to hire less educated workers. The extent and cost of retraining and providing enhanced education to the work force has not been established. There is little question the impact on workers’ compensation injuries and claims will be huge.  All agree that automation, which is increasingly being employed for tasks that were traditionally performed manually by workers, will lead to fewer injuries and significantly reduce the number of workers’ compensation claims and the system currently in place in the future.

A Primer on the Legal Approach to Aggravations of Preexisting Conditions

By Jane Salem, Staff Attorney

Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation

Nashville, TN

 

Last summer, the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board wrote, “This appeal highlights the often daunting challenge of quantifying causation in circumstances where an employee is alleging a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing condition.”

Daunting indeed and an understatement. For over a century, courts have been wrestling with these cases, and it remains a hot topic to this day. The good news is, additional guidance is coming soon from the full Tennessee Supreme Court.

Looking back

The Supreme Court first considered the issue in Tennessee Eastman Corporation v. Russell in 1924, just five years after the Workers’ Compensation Law took effect.

In Russell, the employee worked the night shift in a distillery and was found dead one morning, appearing to have fallen from a platform. The employer argued he suffered from “epileptic fits,” but the trial court found he wasn’t epileptic. Instead, the judge concluded the employee had been “previously injuriously affected physically by the fumes and odors arising from the vats or stills,” and that this likely happened again, causing the deadly fall.

The high Court didn’t cite case law from other states but relied on treatises—books by learned scholars—to find the injury compensable: “[A] pre-existing weakness or disease will not prevent the injury from being the result of an accident, if the accident is the immediate cause of the injury,” It wrote. Further, “an acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing ailment may be a personal injury, in the sense of the compensation laws.”

Fast-forward to 1948. In Swift & Co. v. Howard, the Supreme Court held, “When an employer employs a workman he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person.” (Emphasis added). The principle of taking the employee “as is” remains good law. The Appeals Board cited it in 2023 in a case that was appealed to a Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Panel. The employee unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the Reform Act of 2013 before a Supreme Court Panel in Worrell v. Obion County School District.

More than three decades after Swift, the Supreme Court narrowed the compensability of work aggravations in Boling v. Raytheon Co. In this 1969 opinion, the Court made a distinction for cases where the aggravation resulted solely in an increase in pain. They wrote, “what we have here is an employee with a disabling injury or disease not related to employment, but the employment does aggravate the disabling injury or disease by making the pain worse. This situation does not constitute an ‘accident’ as this word is used in our workmen’s compensation statutes.”

The Court reiterated this limitation in 1987 in Smith v. Smith’s Transfer Corp. The justices concluded that the employee’s “work for defendant aggravated her pre-existing condition by making the pain worse but it did not otherwise injure or advance the severity of her [preexisting condition] or result in any other disabling condition. Thus, we find plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident within the meaning of the Worker’s Compensation Act[.]”

More than two decades passed before the full Supreme Court released Trosper v. Armstrong Wood Products in 2008. In Trosper, the justices settled the question of what an employee must show for an aggravation to be compensable. They noted inconsistent results from earlier appellate cases and gave the following rule:

“[T]he employee does not suffer a compensable injury where the work activity aggravates the pre-existing condition merely by increasing the pain however if the work injury advances the severity of the preexisting condition or if as a result of the pre-existing condition the employee suffers a new distinct injury other than increased pain then the work injury is compensable.”

Looking ahead: compensability under the ‘New Law’

Shortly after passage of the Reform Act in 2013, the newly-created Appeals Board questioned the viability of Trosper, in a case where compensability was challenged at the interlocutory (nonfinal) stage. The Board pointed out that the Trosper Court applied the remedial construction to find the injury compensable. The Reform Act did away with that and requires courts to construe the workers’ compensation law fairly and impartially. The Act also defined “injury” to exclude “the aggravation of a preexisting disease, condition, or ailment unless it can be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the aggravation arose primarily out of employment.”

The Appeals Board reversed the trial court’s ruling after an expedited hearing determined that the employee was likely to show he would prevail at trial that his aggravation of a preexisting condition arose primarily out of employment. The case is Miller v. Lowe’s Homes Centers, Inc., released in 2015.

Judges on the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims haven’t cited Trosper since. But notably, a Supreme Court Panel did recently in Edwards-Bradford v. Kellogg Company, a case where the date of injury was after the new law took effect.

More recently in The AdMIRable Review, we informed you that a complex case involving the aggravation of an employee’s preexisting knee osteoarthritis was heading to a Tennessee Supreme Court Workers’ Compensation Panel.

In that case, Edwards v. Peoplease, the Appeals Board split. The majority cited several post-Reform Act cases and gave guidance for trial judges:

“[A] court can consider several probative factors in determining whether a work-related accident contributed more than fifty percent in causing the need for medical treatment, including but by no means limited to: (1) evidence that employee was asymptomatic prior to the work accident but became symptomatic after the work accident; (2) evidence that the employee had no functional limitations to the injured body part prior to the work accident but had functional limitations after the work accident; and (3) evidence, or a lack of evidence, of an ‘anatomic change’ to the body part or condition in question.”

The majority concluded the trial court erred by finding that the primary cause of the employee’s need for bilateral total knee replacements was a work accident, not the employee’s underlying severe osteoarthritis.

The dissent, however, concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the work accident caused new or increased symptoms that led to functional limitations and that the need for the knee replacements was “hastened” by the work accident.

Notably, the Appeals Board in Edwards didn’t cite Trosper or Edwards-Bradford.

The big news now is that instead of a Supreme Court Panel, the full Tennessee Supreme Court will decide the case.

The full Court rarely hears workers’ compensation cases anymore. It also hasn’t tackled a case involving an aggravation of a preexisting condition in nine years and not since passage of the Reform Act. In that time, however, plenty of aggravation cases have been before the Appeals Board and Panels—which shows how truly “daunting” these cases can be. They’re often medical-intensive. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Court asked the parties to brief the issue of how medical testimony should be considered by an appellate court. Is the trial court’s decision considered “de novo” (of new) or for an abuse of discretion? The outcome of that question is important because it might affect a party’s decision on whether to appeal an order.

Perhaps the Supreme Court will tell us in Edwards if/when Trosper applies. Regardless, Edwards is likely to be the next seminal case on the topic, for application for decades to come. We’ll let you know the outcome in an upcoming issue of The AdMIRable Review.

 

Injured in the Workplace Twice: Can Injured Workers Who Receive Medical Treatment from Their Employers Sue for Medical Malpractice?

By Jordan F. Mayes and Eric L. Baxley

Staff Attorneys for the S.C. Workers’ Compensation Commission

 

When a healthcare worker is injured on the job and their employer, taking it upon themself to treat the injury, commits medical malpractice, do workers’ compensation acts allow the worker to sue their employer for medical malpractice?

To illustrate this conundrum, consider the following hypothetical fact pattern:

Rowan Lassiter stepped from behind the nurses’ station to attend to the patient in room 456. She stopped for a moment to massage her bandaged finger, which had grown increasingly swollen and painful over the past week after cutting it while working with a patient. She proceeded past rooms 452, 453, 454…the hallway started to dim. It wasn’t until Rowan lay staring at the ceiling from the linoleum floor that she realized the old florescent lights weren’t what was on the fritz.

As a battle for consciousness arrested her, she was only numbly aware of the thumpity-thump of soft-soled shoes quickly gathering around her.

Rowan opened bleary eyes in a pre-op room.

A pre-op nurse and a nurse anesthetist stood in Rowan’s room. The nurses had their backs to her, but she overheard “infected cut” and “sepsis”.

Seemingly aware that she’d awoken, both nurses turned their attention to her. She started to listen as one nurse spoke, but an empty vial of anesthetic in the other nurse’s hand shifted her focus. The small bottle concerned her.??? If she never regained conciousness hows this known?? She raced through the crevices of her mind to figure out why but, Ugh!, the medication was starting to kick in. Rowan succumbed to the anesthesia, unaware that she had just waged her final battle for consciousness.

The coroner’s autopsy report listed Rowan’s cause of death as sepsis shock.

The Estate of Rowan Lassiter brought a wrongful death suit for medical malpractice against several defendants, including Cranford Health Care, alleging the negligent administration of the decedent’s pre-op anesthesia.

Cranford Health Care filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, as Rowan Lassiter’s employer, that the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act provided immunity from tort suits by employees or their estate. Accordingly, the movant requested to be dropped as a party defendant in this matter. How should the judge rule?

Rowan’s story illustrates a special dilemma in workers’ compensation law. South Carolina has a unique statute concerning this situation, whereby employers are not liable for damages that result from medical malpractice, but the consequences of any malpractice are considered part of the work-related injury; therefore, the employer is responsible for compensation and treatment that is due as a result of the malpractice.[1]

When it comes to tort suits against an employer, as is the case in most states, South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act contains a provision which generally prohibits workers from suing their employer under tort laws for work-related accidents and limits injured employees’ rights and remedies to those provided by the Act.[2]

However, there are exceptions to this rule; one exception is the dual persona doctrine. In Lex Larson’s treatise on workers’ compensation law, he states, “[a]n employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if—and only if—it possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to its status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes that persona as a separate legal person.”[3] The implementation of this doctrine varies across states, but the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the dual persona doctrine since Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors, LLC (2013).

Dual Persona vs Dual Capacity

The adoption of the dual persona doctrine comes from the ashes of the dual capacity doctrine. According to Larson, the dual capacity doctrine states that an employer is vulnerable to suit as a third party if the employee is injured while the employer is acting in a capacity other than that of employer.[4] South Carolina’s Supreme Court further clarified that, “[w]hile the ‘dual persona’ doctrine recognizes different identities, the ‘dual capacity’ doctrine recognizes different activities or relationships.”

Larson, along with most modern courts, decries the dual capacity doctrine, as employers regularly act in multiple additional capacities, including as landowners, repair technicians, and safety inspectors. Larson argues that to bypass exclusivity provisions so frequently, simply because many employers inherently occupy multiple capacities, is to needlessly erode the clearly stated legislative purpose of making workers’ compensation benefits a broadly exclusive remedy.[5]

Applying the Dual Persona Doctrine

The dual persona doctrine is typically only applied in a very narrow range of circumstances. Courts nearly unanimously hold that the dual persona doctrine does not allow employees to sue their employer for torts committed as the owner or occupier of land, as most employers own, occupy, or maintain premises in some way.[6] Likewise, courts also nearly unanimously hold that an employer who manufactures a product is generally not liable under tort to its employees for injuries caused by using the product at work; the employer’s additional role as the product’s manufacturer does not, by itself, create a sufficiently distinct persona so as to satisfy the dual persona doctrine.[7]

But what about medical malpractice by a healthcare provider who is also the patient’s employer, as illustrated earlier with Rowan Lassiter?  First, in Tatum v. Med. Univ. of S.C. (2001), the SC Supreme Court ruled the dual persona doctrine did not apply to a case in which an MUSC employee, seeking treatment for a work-related injury, was referred to an MUSC doctor. Subsequently, the injured employee sought to sue for medical malpractice. The SC Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision, did not apply the dual persona doctrine because MUSC is only one legal entity, which happened to be acting in multiple capacities.[8]

Twelve years later, however, in Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors, LLC, the South Carolina Supreme Court explicitly adopted the dual persona doctrine while unambiguously refusing to adopt the dual capacity doctrine.[9] This was a direct departure from the precedent set in Tatum; the court stated in Mendenall that, “[a]lthough the Tatum majority’s discussion of the dual persona doctrine is correct, its application of the law to the facts of that case was erroneous.” Citing Larson, the court noted that, “[i]f the dual persona doctrine is to apply, it must be possible to say that the duty arose solely from the nonemployer persona…. For only in such a case can the second persona be really distinct from the employer persona. In other words, it is not enough … that the second persona impose additional duties. They must be totally separate from and unrelated to those of the employment.”[10]

In 2024, in Baxter v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, the SC Court of Appeals expressed the belief that the Mendenall decision may have restored the Court of Appeals’ original reasoning in Tatum, which applied the dual persona doctrine to medical malpractice claims against an employer acting as a medical services provider. In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals noted that the Mendenall decision favorably cited a Michigan case, Herbolsheimer v. SMS Holding Co., 239 Mich. App. 236, 608 N.W.2d 487 (2000), which stated that a co-employee’s medical malpractice claim was, “the type of situation to which the dual persona doctrine was intended to apply”.[11]

It is worth noting, however, that this statement from Herbolsheimer is based on an earlier case in which a city police officer was shot on the job and received negligent care at a city-owned hospital; the court found that even though both parties worked for the city, the police department and the hospital were practically two separate entities. This scenario is distinct from one in which the worker is directly employed by the hospital. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the South Carolina Supreme Court will apply the dual persona doctrine in this way.[12]

According to Larson, these kinds of cases are usually barred.[13] Neighboring states provide little guidance for how South Carolina courts should proceed; North Carolina courts have not addressed the dual persona or dual capacity doctrines????,[14] and Georgia courts, while refusing to adopt the dual capacity doctrine, have left the dual persona doctrine open to future adoption by the courts.[15]

These scenarios are distinct from examples of unrelated transactions; if a healthcare worker is injured outside of work and is treated by their employer, the dual persona doctrine doesn’t apply, as the employee’s injury was not subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act to begin with.[16]

Returning to the hypothetical of Rowan Lassiter, it is unclear whether the South Carolina Supreme Court would allow the malpractice suit to go forward, as the application of the dual persona doctrine to cases of medical malpractice against an employee remains tenuous for the time being. Commissioners and attorneys should keep an eye out for future similar cases before the South Carolina Supreme Court, as a decision on this matter may very well set the precedent for South Carolina’s neighbors.

[1] SC Code Ann. § 42–15–70.
[2] SC Code Ann. § 42–1–540. See also Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors, LLC, 401 S.C. 558, 562, 738 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2013).
[3] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.01[1] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2012).
[4] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.01[2].
[5] Id.
[6] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.02.
[7] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.03.
[8] Tatum v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 552 S.E.2d 18, 24 (2001), abrogated by Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors, LLC, 738 S.E.2d 251 (2013).
[9] Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors, LLC, 401 S.C. 558, 563, 738 S.E.2d 251, 253–54 (2013).
[10] Id. at 564.
[11] Baxter v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 905 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 2024), citing Herbolsheimer..
[12] See Howard v. White, 523 N.W.2d 220 (1994) and Fletcher v. Harafajee, 299 N.W.2d 53 (1980).
[13] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.08[1].
[14] Anderson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
[15] Porter v. Beloit Corp., 391 S.E.2d 430 (1990).
[16] Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.08.

 

 

NAWCJ Lunch & Learn

By Pamela Johnson

Workers’ Compensation Judge

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

Knoxville, TN

 

SAVE THE DATE

 

NEXT LUNCH AND LEARN: The NAWCJ will hold its next one-hour Lunch and Learn program on Tuesday, June 3, 2025, at 12:30 p.m. Eastern Time. (This is a schedule change). The topic is Presumptions & First Responders. Save the Date and join your fellow NAWCJ judges to engage in the discussion on the latest hot topics.

The NAWCJ launched this virtual initiative as a benefit for our members and to supplement discussions held at the “Boot Camp” and the annual Judicial College. We hope you join us to learn and discuss relevant and engaging workers’ compensation topics from the comfort of your home or office. The aim of this program is to gain knowledge, build collegiality, and develop professionally.

TOPIC OR SPEAKER SUGGESTIONS: The NAWCJ Lunch and Learn Committee is always looking for suggestions for future Lunch & Learn topics and speakers. Please email pamela.johnson@tn.gov with your suggestions.

PRIOR LUNCH AND LEARNS: Have you missed an earlier Lunch and Learn or want to watch one again, NAWCJ members may access the NAWCJ YouTube Playlist at the link below:

https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLRQXmaoZ1QCzhgk4DAPDt1nHZ9lsyyBrw&feature=shared

UPCOMING ZOOM LINK: Two weeks before next Lunch and Learn, the NAWCJ will send out an email blast to all members with a link to join the Zoom meeting.

FUTURE LUNCH AND LEARNS: Lunch and Learns are held twice per year, on the first Tuesday at 12:30 p.m. Eastern Time, in the months of June and December.

  • Tuesday, December 2, 2025 – TBD

 

 

 

NAWCJ’S Curriculum Committee Announces Its Lineup for the Judicial College in August 2025

By Timothy Conner

Judge, Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Commission

Knoxville, TN

 

The NAWCJ’s annual Judicial College will convene August 17-20 at the beautiful World Center Marriott in Orlando, Florida.  The Judicial College occurs in conjunction with WCI’s Annual Conference, which attracts approximately 5,000 workers’ compensation professionals from across the country.  This year, the NAWCJ’s Curriculum Committee is excited to announce its lineup of educational presentations geared toward workers’ compensation adjudicators.

Monday morning will begin with a discussion of security issues judges must consider in both their professional and personal lives.  We will then have panel discussions on evidence, judicial independence, and ex parte communications.  Our lunchtime presentation will offer a comparative analysis of how various jurisdictions address important workers’ compensation topics.  Monday afternoon sessions will focus on transitioning from advocate to adjudicator and how to make “game time” decisions during hearings.

Tuesday morning, you will have an opportunity to view a live surgery as part of the WCI conference.  The adjudicators will then reconvene to discuss how to become better legal writers and how to deal with the coming reality of artificial intelligence in the legal profession.  After lunch, we will hear the always-entertaining presentation of interesting and unique workers’ compensation cases that have been decided in the past year, followed by in-depth discussions of medical issues and impairment ratings.

Wednesday morning, we will offer a lively and fast-paced presentation called “60 Tips in 60 Minutes,” during which long-winded judges will try to keep their discussion of each issue to under a minute, or else suffer the good-natured rebuke of the moderator.  We will then discuss how generational differences can impact adjudicators.  Finally, our conference will end by focusing on how adjudicators can maintain good mental health and mindfulness.

All in all, the Curriculum Committee has put together a program of what promises to be excellent presentations on wide-ranging issues that affect the day-to-day work of workers’ compensation adjudicators.  We hope you will consider joining us in Orlando August 17-20.

 

Review of the NAWCJ New Judges’ Boot Camp 2025

By Laura R. Beasley

Administrative Law Judge

Kentucky Department of Workers’ Claims

Louisville, KY

 

From February 25th to 27th, 2025, the National Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary (NAWCJ) hosted its annual Virtual New Judge’s Boot Camp. This event served as a valuable introduction for new judges to the organization and its leadership, fostering a sense of community among judges across various jurisdictions. The presence of judges from different regions provided a unique opportunity for comparative analysis, enriching the learning experience.

I found the event exceptionally well-organized, with a carefully paced schedule that allowed for deep dives into crucial subject matter, while also incorporating a generous midday break that offered time for reflection and catching up on work.

The topics covered were both broad and practical, ranging from essential tips on evidentiary issues and judicial writing, to managing difficult litigants in the courtroom. Additionally, discussions on the growing role of technology and AI in the legal field were particularly timely and insightful.

Some of the most meaningful discussions centered on the personal and professional transformation that comes with stepping into the role of a judge. The transition from advocate to adjudicator is profound, and the ethical considerations unique to the judiciary were emphasized throughout. These conversations underscored the weight of our responsibilities as civil servants, highlighting the critical importance of impartiality. One of the key takeaways was a powerful reminder: “We are in the people business, and people want to be heard.”

This message resonated even more deeply during the review of the historical context of workers’ compensation law. It served as a poignant reminder of the significant effect our work has on people’s lives.  To echo the words of Judge E.R. Mills, who recognized the substantial impact of workers’ compensation law:

“Workers’ compensation is one of the most important fields of law. It touches more lives than any other area. It involves the payment of substantial sums, directly impacting the welfare of individuals, the success of businesses, and the financial well-being of consumers.”

I am deeply grateful to the organizers and presenters for their insightful contributions and for offering this invaluable opportunity to new judges. Their wisdom and fellowship made this welcoming experience truly beneficial.